Post-Graduation, Post-Whiskey Blogging -- Religion

More than that; not only is it consistent to be an atheist and a moral realist. It's consistent to hold that God-belief is unreasonable, whereas moral belief is *not* unreasonable. In other words, it's possible to be a rational moral-realist atheist.

So your analogy breaks down. If we add in the premise that it's okay to be an asshole only towards irrationality, then the rational moral realist could consistently be an asshole towards irrational theists. (Unless "don't be an asshole" was part of their posited objective moral code, but I take it that's a separate issue from your intended argument.)

The problem is that we're still at the is/ought line. It may be entirely true that man is a being that evolved a moral sense - a belief I hold - but that doesn't tell us why we should follow that evolutionary path. Moving to the oughts means leaving materialism.

- Josh

So is the Copenhagen interpretation, by those lights.

At any rate, we typically consider humans to be the only sentient animals; that does not imply an anthropocentric view of the universe. It may well be that after that point in evolution where such concepts as "free will" or "consciousness" or whatever you like begin to attach, morality becomes operative.

Though I don't think it's clear that moral standards don't apply to some animals. Regardless, I'm certainly not being anthropocentric--I believe any being of sufficient agency should be held to moral standards. Humans just seem to be the only candidates we've run into thus far.

"If there *is* an objective moral code, that's powerful support for an anthropocentric view of the universe. "

I don't think so. You might be mistake as to the nature of this "objectivity". It's objectively true that you shouldn't flap your front limbs and jump off a building. That's a moral statement of sorts by my understanding of morals. Yet it isn't true for a bird. However if we were bird like creatures surely there would be moral rules that would apply to us but not humans. Something can be objectively true for a species due to it's nature.

I've discussed this before. Thinking that morals are objective vs. subjective is a false dichotomy. Morals are both objective and subjective.

Animals do follow certain moral precepts though they don't verbalize them. For instance, vampire bats have an inherent sense of cheating regarding blood sharing. There are many other examples. Morality is something that evolved in us.

Why are humans held to this higher standard, while animals can engage in infanticide and use each other as means to an end. For animals, the sky's the limit!
Ask yourself who holds humans to this higher standard. The answer is other humans. Certainly there is no proof that gods do. Same goes for animals. It's other animals that enforce their moral standards. Standards like "This territory is mine. Get off it you are poaching."

To be clear, I was not there[end of subject]

Can anyone corroborate your alibi?

Apples have a lot in common, making it possible to learn. If there were no common features between one apple and the next, then, even if we tried to make a category encompassing the two objects, the category would be useless to us. But, having learned how to eat some apples (e.g. clean it, check it for defects, bite into it; procedure for an orange is somewhat different), we gain a general ability to eat apples. This is not compulsory, but if we want to eat apples it makes sense to learn ways to eat them, and then to apply them. This would not have been possible if "apple" were merely an arbitrary category that encompassed disparate objects. Apples form a natural kind. We have developed the concept of "apple" because they already form a natural kind. We recognize their commonality.

Evil acts also form a natural kind, encompassing the more particular natural kinds of murder, theft, and so on. We react in more or less the same way if an evil act is committed against us. For example, if we have the opportunity, we attract as much attention as we can, so that the evildoer no longer has the protection of secrecy and anonymity. We ask for help and support, if the opportunity arises. We attempt to neutralize the evildoer in full view of everyone else and with their help if possible. This is not compulsory either, but if we want to protect ourselves from harm and loss in case of an evil act it makes sense to learn ways to do so.

There are reasons for what we learn. We bite into an apple directly without peeling it because the peel is edible - in contrast to the peel of an orange. And we attract attention if we are the victim of evil because publicity is a powerful weapon against evil. Evil thrives in secrecy (e.g. burglary) and anonymity (e.g. a ski mask). (Failing that, evil needs overwhelming force to avoid being snuffed out - the overwhelming force of a state, for example.)

Just as apples have certain properties which it is useful to know about, evil also has certain properties which it is useful to know about.

Caveat: this is a very incomplete account of evil, just as it is a very incomplete account of apples. For example, I have not eliminated pears or plums from my description of apples, yet there is a difference. Similarly, I have not completely distinguished evil from possible non-evil, yet there is a difference. Clearly, however, apples do have aspects in common which - even looking just at the ones mentioned here - they do not have in common with everything else, and similarly evil acts do have aspects in common, and even restricting ourselves to what has been touched on here, evil does not have those aspects in common with everything else.

Further caveat: like most things, the kind "apple" has a boundary which may not be sharply defined, and there may be particular apples which are in certain respects unlike other apples. Maybe some apples have inedible skins. This does not invalidate the concept "apple".

Similarly for evil.

So why isn't "Don't steal unless you can get away with it" a moral precept? Because it makes the unenlightened stance that you can possibly ever be sure you can get away with it, and fails to properly factor in the consequences. Just try to get a good job once people know you steal.

Invalid argument. You have just defined stealing as something you can't get away with - or rather, something you can't be sure you can get away with. No fair defining away the problem you raise.

The previous parts of your argument boil down to "Anything you can get away with is moral." Your attempt here to disclaim that boils down to "... but you can't know for sure what you can get away with, so morality is only those things that would be still be in your self-interest even if you got caught doing it." Which is all fine and dandy, except that this now defines morality by what happens to you when others find out that you've done it. Which means that today, in America, smoking pot is immoral - it's absolutely not in my best interest to do it if I get caught. But in Amsterdam it's perfectly moral, and it was perfectly moral in many places many years ago, and someday it may be perfectly moral in America once again.

Does that sound like a system of morality?

How about this for a moral statement: You ought not to murder others because then those that survive are likely to retaliate against you. Now what problem do you have with that statement?

Aside from the fact that it's not always true, nothing. But I'm fairly certain that this is not what Scott means when he writes of "objective morality."

And I've been on this blog for the last three of those!

“A militant atheist is a non-pluralist atheist. Someone who doesn't think that religious should be tolerated but rather shamed for "primitive superstitions."

Well that’s two definitions.

The first fails to distinguish between violent and non-violent non-pluralism. So it lumps people like Stalin in with the non-violent social behaviorists. I had a coworker who was a social behaviorist and he believed one could remake society in to a non-pluralistic atheist utopia, he was a very quite and peaceful guy. A pacifist he claims to have gotten out of going to Vietnam by claiming to be a homosexual. He thought his society could be attained by behavioral modification. His beliefs were quite beyond the reach of reason and were quite faith based.

Now surely Stalin was a militant atheist in the true sense of the word, but my coworker wasn’t. I’m openly atheist but he was not. I only found out about his atheism in a private discussion.

The word pluralist also has many shades different meanings. I used one meaning above but there are others. It’s hard to tell how to use the term with a non-ideological term like atheism. Positive ideologies like communism and behaviorism can be non-pluralistic because they have a collection of social beliefs to force on others. The same cannot be said about atheism in general. Non-pluralists in the religious sphere can be so at several levels, either of their own particular sect or at the level of a whole religion, or a collection of religions. For instance, the Boy Scouts are a pluralists but only extend that pluralism to religions who’s adherents believe in a “Greater Power”, which in fact makes them bigots.

The second definition is vague and ungrammatical so it’s hard to tell what you mean. You use the word tolerated but this has several meanings. The poor grammar around and about the word religious makes it hard to tell what you mean. Perhaps you can fix it up. Do you meant “the religious” or “religious views” or something else. Even if you fix this up I think your definition will be very broad. There is qualitative difference in the intolerance of Stalin for the religious and the intolerance of Dawkins. One is an intolerance for the existence of another human being while the other is intolerance of irrationality of the belief and not the person. Certainly the first kind of intolerance is properly referred to as militancy. The second kind can only be referred to as militant only in a rhetorical and derogatory fashion.

Intolerance of irrationality is the hallmark of science. It’s not something best described as militant but as scientific.

I’m sure Dawkins, Dennett, and Harris do not fit the first definition. None of them are calling for a non-pluralist society to my knowledge. They only fit the second definition in only a narrow sense which would not properly be referred to as militant.

Now I’m well aware that “militant atheist” is a common term but I think it is a derogatory term when applied to anybody other than one who intends to use violence.

” Today the term militant atheism may be used by theists as an epithet for the "militant evolutionists [who] want to silence the idea of creation".[15] (Evolution, however, neither implies nor is implied by atheism, so this linguistic usage is effectively idiomatic.) It is sometimes used pejoratively to describe people who are considered too actively and outspokenly – or militantly – campaign for atheism and against religion: "those who advocate the elimination of religion" as opposed to "progressive, enlightened people who are simply 'nonbelievers'."[16] It does not, however, imply any form of violence or call for it - indeed, these are undocumented.”

” That does NOT seem fair. Someone who pickets funerals and proselytizes and ostracizes others for not believing in god could be called a militant theist in the same sense.”

My original questions were designed to make the reader think. Apparently it didn’t work on you. Questions that should have arisen in your mind should have been “Why does the term “militant Islam” or “militant Christianity” conjure up the kind of person who flies planes into buildings while “militant atheists” conjures up the kind of person who is merely outspoken about his own beliefs. If we are going to speak of Dawkins as militant wouldn’t it be fair to speak of the Pope as militant also?

” If you were to seriously argue that suicide bombing is rooted in serious attempts at religious conversion then you might have a case.”
This is really lame. Why would you impute such a ridiculous position to someone who doesn’t agree with you? I can assure you that Harris doesn’t believe this, nor do I. I think there is a failure on your part to understand the purpose of Allah telling Mohammed to spread slaughter through the land. There are three choices given to the nonbeliever convert, submit, or warfare. The slaughter itself is certainly not a serious effort to convert the actual victim but it does serve to coerce the living to accept the other two alternatives.

In Islamic warfare the ultimate sacrifice of death is not considered suicide. Thus suicide bombing is not understood the way we see it. For them it’s martyrdom. We use the word very differently so it’s confusing to us. A martyr for us is someone who dies for a cause but as an innocent, not as a murderer of innocents. Do all Muslims think this way, no, but polls indicate a significant number do. Unfortunately many leftists see it this way also because they think the defining aspect of martyrdom is sacrifice. They ignore the difference between being murdered for your religion and dying in the process of murdering for your religion.

” BTW, yes I know what Jihad means and if you're the sort of person who thinks that citing the definition of broad term is some kind of point you should probably think hard first.”
Crusade is a broad term also and yet Muslims are hypersensitive about that word. Perhaps they have a better sense for their own term for religious warfare. I don’t think that you do know what the word jihad means. You really do seem to be confused by words that have multiple meanings. You need to take the meaning from the context. When Muslims are cutting the heads off infidels while crying for jihad you can be sure they are not using the other meaning. It’s the bad meaning.

You see when you use the term “militant” as an adjective in front of atheist it’s not the bad meaning. It means “outspoken” and frankly that’s a good thing when you are challenging irrational dogma.

But "nope not a one" is a serious overplay of your hand because there are things we take on faith. As we're discussing elsewhere, one major one is "the tendencies, behaviors and observable laws that we've observed in the past will tend to hold true in the future.""

What's this "we" shit paleface? It's not a serious overplay at all. I hold all my beliefs tentatively.

If you think that the expectation that something will behave the same way in the future as it has in the past then you've drastically expanded the the meaning of faith. Does it really require faith to believe that diamonds are hard? Not in the strict sense that I defined before. Not even in the less strict sense most people mean the word faith.

But lets go ahead and broaden the term to your liking. I still don't have that kind of faith either since the minute I have evidence that diamonds turn soft then I'll abandon that belief, for diamonds at least. That would be an example of me believing something in error and not on the basis of faith.

Are you sure your an atheists and not a fundamentalist? I get this argument a lot from them. Science isn't faith based and nor does personal beliefs need to be.