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Religion, Morality, and Other Bunk
Submitted by Scott Scheule on Sat, 2007-05-19 00:21.
These sweeping condemnations of anything as globally evil, whether it be the state or religion, are useful only as rhetorical flourishes, and are fine so long as, deep down, we admit the truth is more complex.
Of course religion does not poison everything. Many a religious precept has a positive message that few atheists would disagree with. Christians harp on charity, for instance. So any realistic evaluation of religion is going to have to undertake a complex balancing of the good and the bad.
That's one issue.
The second issue is the puzzling question of where morality comes from if not from a deity. Now one can believe morality exists even in an atheistic universe--as I do--but anyone taking this position has to admit this kind of floating moral objectivity--the idea that there exists these spooky normative truths out there--is rather quite close to being religious in the first place. One simply believes in an invisible morality rather than an invisible sentience.
If one takes the other route and chooses to simply not believe in either religion or morality, that's fair, but if that's the case it's hard to take anti-religious outrage all that seriously, since we're simply debating preferences with no truth value.
In his disappointing God Delusion, Dawkins seems to express the sort of atheistic moral realism that I've described above, advocating utilitarianism as the correct theory. Moreover, he writes that he does not have to describe where morality comes from to make his point [that religion is nasty]; rather he only has to prove it does not come from God. But if Dawkins wishes to believe there is an objective right and wrong, he has to believe in an invisible normative universe, which, as I've said, is a leap of faith that seems on par with believing in God. If such leaps of faith are valid, that cuts out much of his book's epistemological thrust.
At any rate, if the brightest Jews on Earth believe in something, as Clara admits, then we should at the very least be hesitant to ridicule that belief as "drivel."
Micha's assertion that rule consequentialism doesn't require such a leap of faith is false.
Presuming that the rule consequentialist [indeed, you could put any moral stance in here] believes that rule consequentialism is an objectively true moral stance, then he believes in moral truth. In particular, he believes in the moral fact: "One should act as to maximize [average or total] utility." Now, where this moral fact exists if not in some "invisible normative universe" is not clear. Certainly nothing about the material world compels anyone to maximize utility, or to make any other moral choice.
Again, if morality is objective, it does take a leap of faith that seems "on par with believing in God" to believe that it exists. I say that because, so far as moral truth exists, it would seem to be completely undetectable by any other sense. So, however we're sensing morality, it doesn't seem far removed from the inspiration that theists rely on to support their belief system--an intuitive process.
Tangentially, I admit after years of hearing the term I still have no idea what consequentialism is. If it's utilitarianism proper, then we might as well refer to it as such. If it's something else, than perhaps somebody can point me to a definition.
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saltism
Wasn't that a comment at one point?
Anyway, the consequentialism stuff always strikes me as strange these days too (though I knoew plenty of very smart people who would call themselves that.) It seems like "saltism" or something for food. Whereas it's clear to everyone that people's enjoyment of different flavors comes from a variety of factors, we're going to simply select our favorite flavor- salt- and refuse to consider any other flavor as important in the "goodness" of the food. Of course that's precisely why consequentialists wind up bending into pretzels (as do Kantians and other similarly situated groups)
over problems like this one:
You give your suicidal neighbor a gun hoping he'll kill himself and, by pure chance, he used that gun to defend himself and his family from an attack and his life is suddenly improved.
Clearly that act was wrong, and everybody sees it. You gave the gun in hopes he'd off himself, you knew he was suicidal and that's precisely why you did it. Do the consequences really even matter in that case? Anyone who's taken an ethics class can readily produce these situations, and yet the only people who really have trouble with them are the people who artificially restrict their consideration of ethical factors. It's like talking about blueberry pie with a person who's insisting that the 1/4 tsp of salt in the crust is the only important thing.
aaaathatsfiveas.blogspot.com
ethics isn't so mysterious
Moral facts are no more mysterious than mathematical or other abstract facts. Such abstractions aren't part of the world per se, of course. But why hold that against them? They're easy enough to understand as a kind of rational construction, i.e. an abstract truth is simply whatever we would conclude on ideal rational reflection. ("2+2=4" is one such. "One ought not to cause gratuitous harm" is another.)
This is nothing like believing in gods or unicorns or similar such non-abstract, non-rational entities.
"If [consequentialism is] utilitarianism proper, then we might as well refer to it as such.."
'Consequentialism' is a broad church for those who think that what ultimately matters is making the world a better place. Utilitarianism adds that what makes the world "better" is increasing aggregate welfare. (Non-utilitarian consequentialists might want to advance different values besides welfare, e.g. equality or aesthetics. But they all agree that it's the result that ultimately matters. What's "right" is determined -- in some, perhaps complicated, fashion -- by what's "good", rather than vice versa.)
One advantage of rule
One advantage of rule consequentialism is that it avoids your particular thought experiment. The focus is on general rules that govern iterated human interaction, and not on ad hoc situationalism.
Not that I think rule consequentialism is immune from that sort of criticism. Pretty much every moral theory is subject to these sorts of hypothetical problems. Sometimes you can wriggle out of the hypo, and sometimes you just have to bite the bullet or adopt another theory.
explain
I fail to see how it "avoids" my thought experiment. Say that happens (it hardly seems unrealistic) how do we ethically analyze that scenario?
We of course agree that every ethical theory apart from cognitive intuitionism is immune from the sorts of critiques (if you have one of intuitionism I'd love to hear it.) Again, I'd go back to saltism. You might say that saltism doesn't have a problem when confronted with a cake because it focuses on the flavors that tend to produce good taste, but has exactly that problem. Namely, there are other flavors that produce good taste.
aaaathatsfiveas.blogspot.com
Let's use a similar but
Let's use a similar but easier to understand example. You are waiting at a light to cross a busy street with your kids. One breaks free and runs across against the light. He's made it across but not only that he's done so without all the waiting. Certainly that's a positive consequence. So under naive consequentialism that was the right thing to do.
Rule consequentialism would consider not just actual success but the potential for success. It would take into account risks and other factors. It would then generate principles based on those risks.
So it would come up with the rule not to cross against the light.
Now, we can flip this around. Suppose that's the rule and it's on naive deontological basis that we evaluate it . Well suppose that the traffic light is broken and it just doesn't change. Suppose also there are gaps in the traffic where it is safe to cross. Well under the rule you can never cross. So you never get home.
So you switch to "exception deontology" where you can break rule when the conditions are beyond those handled by the rule.
What the difference is between "rule consequentialism" and "exception deontology" I do not know. :) Seems like a fight over nothing to me. Of course one could fight over why the rule was created in the first place. I think ultimately the consequetialist has the upper hand over the "absolute truth" crowd on this topic. Even if one were to prove that a particular rule was always applicable the consequentialist need merely accept that and use it as his reason for obeying the rule.
Consequentialism just puts off
What you just described assumes the badness of getting run over, which assumes the badness of getting hurt or killed.
Maybe the rule is, "don't do something that puts yourself in massive danger of injury or death for no good reason." If that's the rule, then is it really "consequentialist" to argue that you should not cross the road because of the consequences? How is it not deontological, with the deontological rule being the rule not to do something insanely dangerous without a good reason?
How about this rule: "do not murder someone." Now, suppose that, because of this rule, you decide not to point a loaded gun at someone and pull the trigger. Is that consequentialist? After all, his being murdered is merely a consquence of pulling the trigger, it is not identical with it.
Even our acts themselves are mere consequences of our brain activity. If the rule is, "do not strangle your friend," and as a result you do not strangle your frient, in fact what you have done is, you have not sent nerve pulses to your arms and hands, the mere consequence of which would have been strangling your friend. So you have refrained from doing something because of its consequences. So is this consequentialism? If not, why not?
Let's look at the light example. Suppose there's a rule not to cross against the light. And so you don't send the nerve impulses to your leg that would have the consequence of you crossing against the light. Is that consequentialism? If not, why not? It seems to have the form of consequentialism.
How is it not deontological,
How is it not deontological, with the deontological rule being the rule not to do something insanely dangerous without a good reason?
That is not a deontological rule. One definition of "dangerous" is "likely to have adverse or unfortunate consequences." "Without a good reason" further appeals to consequences.
A Kantian at a stop light would consider whether crossing against the light could be made into a universal maxim, or perhaps whether by crossing against the light he would be treating motorists as a means rather than as an end.
The consequentialist is concerned with outcomes -- satisfying his preference to live, maximizing his utility, however you want to put it. The rule consequentialist considers whether it is a better outcome for everyone to obey the light as a rule or to cross when they please. There is a similarity to Kant's deontological argument that we should follow a universalizable maxim, but rule consequentialism is based on the outcome, and can be fine-tuned when different circumstances would produce different outcomes. For example, people should obey the light as a rule, but if there's no traffic and good visibility, or it's an emergency, you can cross against the light. Deontological arguments are based on intrinsic duties so it is harder (or impossible) for them to take into account such pragmatic considerations.
Quibble and avoidance
You're quibbling with my wording (you are pointing out a flaw which could be trivially fixed without altering my point) and completely skirting the question I raised, simply repeating the distinction which I questioned.
The consequentialist is concerned with outcomes -- satisfying his preference to live, maximizing his utility, however you want to put it.
My point is that everything that happens is a consequence of something else. Effecting the satisfaction of deontological rules is itself an outcome of the causal processes that immediately precede it. Thus deontological rules can be recast as consequentialism about everything that leads to the satisfaction of the rules. At least, going by what I've seen here.
Deontological arguments are based on intrinsic duties so it is harder (or impossible) for them to take into account such pragmatic considerations.
My point is that effecting the ultimate consequences which are used by consequentialists as their criteria for deciding what to do can be seen as an intrinsic duty without obviously altering the content of consequentialism, thus recasting consequentialism as deontological.
The Absurdity of Consequentialism
"The consequentialist is concerned with outcomes..."
And thus is no moral system at all. Because we already need to have some way to judge the outcomes good or bad, which implies some prior morality. (E.g., Benthamite utilitarians would argue that we should work towards the consequences that produce "the greatest good for the greatest number." But why should that be our goal? We shouldn't it be the greatest good for me I work towards, or my family, or my tribe, or the people of Uzbekhistan? Consequentialism gets us absolutely nowhere, because it can't tell us what consequences are good!)
whoops
In my above post I wrote "is immune" when I meant "isn't immune" which should be clear from the context.
Brian:
I don't think we have a serious disagreement on this topic, from what I gather. I know about so called "act utilitarianism" like you describe. As I think you point out in your last paragraph, it really just seems about a combination of desperate misinterpretations of events and backflips to rationalize things. Of course, then you have the giant exceptions for when it whiffs (this isn't to say it doesn't get things right 98% of the time like every other moral philosophy does, for instructive reasons.)
What the difference is between "rule consequentialism" and "exception deontology" I do not know. :) Seems like a fight over nothing to me.
Rule consequentalism is not better than the rules it produces (which are debatable) which makes you wonder why "consequentialism" is even mentioned. If it's still consequentialism because we're claiming that the only standard of right and wrong is consequences then we've really done nothing but trojan horse in our old problematic philosophy.
Go back to my example of giving a gun to your neighbor- can you formulate a good rule that helps us with that example while also guiding us ethically? I sure as hell can't- giving someone a gun is often a non-moral act and so i fail to see how any sort of general rule helps us out.
aaaathatsfiveas.blogspot.com
Consequentialism is ex ante.
Under consequentialism, the morality of an action is a fucntion of the consequences the user could reasonably have expected given the information available at the time. All sorts of absurdities can follow from an ex post standard, which is why consequentialism is based on an ex ante standard.
That doesn't answer anything
That doesn't answer anything without saying what consequences it is moral to try and maximize.
harumph
Under consequentialism, the morality of an action is a fucntion of the consequences the user could reasonably have expected given the information available at the time.
Right. But take my example- nothing bad happened. Was it immoral? I understand the distinction so we don't go about penalizing people who couldn't have known better, but are we letting consequentialists say that non-moral actions with bad intentions are immoral, even if they produce good outcomes?
aaaathatsfiveas.blogspot.com
Presuming that the rule
Sure, that's exactly right, by why oh why should we presume that? What good does it do calling something an objectively true moral stance? I have no problem at all rejecting the existence (or more precisely, our knowledge of the existence) of categorical imperatives and simply sticking with hypothetical imperatives. As Barnett formulates it,
"Given the nature of human beings and the world in which they live, if we want a society in which persons can survive and pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity, then we should respect the liberal conception of justice (as defined by natural rights) and the rule of law.
Now, show me a person that does not want to live in a society in which persons can survive and pursue happiness and I will show you a person I cannot have a moral argument with. So what? So morality is contingent on our sharing certain intuitions and desires with each other. Admitting that this is so and noting that it doesnt seem to cause any significant problems does not require any leap of faith in the unprovable and unseen.
Honestly, Scott, we've been over all of this many times before. Hell, Barnett has written the same essay on the concept in at least three different places. Have you truly not come across this before?
Hmm, now that I think about it, it's possible that you weren't a regular commenter at Catallarchy back when I was posting frequently on this topic. I'm just surprised you haven't come across it from your interaction with Barnett.
Hypothetical ethics
"I have no problem at all rejecting the existence (or more precisely, our knowledge of the existence) of categorical imperatives and simply sticking with hypothetical imperatives."
I agree. This is the basis of my ethical beliefs. I take all beliefs as tentative. Although I think at some point they become well tested theories and not mere hypotheticals.
I was not discussing the "imperative" aspect of this phrase.
To be fair
To be fair, though, all the basic questions that have been discussed on this blog were discussed a lot and for a long time before the blog even started. So, if you're going to get on Scott's case for bringing it up again because it was discussed at length already on this blog, someone else could get on your case for bringing it up on this blog in the first place because it had been discussed at length already elsewhere.
"Let's start again, from the top, as if we're suffering from amnesia" is not only inevitable, but useful.
Sure, that's exactly right,
Sure, that's exactly right, by why oh why should we presume that? What good does it do calling something an objectively true moral stance? I have no problem at all rejecting the existence (or more precisely, our knowledge of the existence) of categorical imperatives and simply sticking with hypothetical imperatives.
If you are going to hew to a relativist stance, then there's no reason for you to get so upset about religion. All you're saying is that you don't like the beliefs the religious have--but who cares if you don't like their beliefs? It's not like one set of beliefs is objectively true or false, or truer or falser. In fact, I'm not sure the relativist has any standard with which to judge beliefs. Arguing that the religious are somehow wrong to believe in homophobia, or statism, or whatever, is like arguing with someone that chocolate is better than vanilla.
Now, show me a person that does not want to live in a society in which persons can survive and pursue happiness and I will show you a person I cannot have a moral argument with. So what? So morality is contingent on our sharing certain intuitions and desires with each other. Admitting that this is so and noting that it doesnt seem to cause any significant problems does not require any leap of faith in the unprovable and unseen.
Nor did I say it did. What does require a leap of faith is believing that you therefore ought to do something. Even given that people want X out of a society does not imply that you should work to bring about X [this is presuming that everyone wants the same thing, which they obviously do not, unless you abstract far enough away from the details necessary for implementation of any moral standard]. If that should exists, it must be a moral fact, since nothing in the material world implies it. This is simply Hume's is/ought divide, and pretending the divide isn't there, as you're doing, is not helpful.
Incidentally, if no moral belief is truer than any other, how do you justify excluding those who do "not want to live in a society in which persons can survive and pursue happiness" from the realm of moral argumentation?
At any rate, I think the way I described Barnett's view on natural rights is accurate, and nothing you've said has convinced I've misunderstood anything. Even a teleological standard requires a theory of the good, and a theory of the good is, however true or false, mystical. For honesty's sake, I should also point out my suspicion is Barnett is trying to have his cake and eat it too, by glossing Kantian principles with a teleological shine. Such a move can only succeed if one keeps the theory of which consequences that it is moral to pursue purposefully vague--which, so far as I can tell, Barnett does. Indeed, I think most "consequentialists" do this.
oops
(Sorry, my previous comment was responding to the main post, not the 'Saltism' comment; I clicked the wrong button...)
Religion doesn't poison everything
"Of course religion does not poison everything. "
An atheist hallelujah to that. It's a ridiculous sentence. I'm hoping Micha will back off all this demonization. He does it when arguing immigration and now he does it with religion. I think it's a vice. One I hope he learns to do without.
Even with my deep loathing for Islam I would never say it "poisons everything". I could talk about a particular tenet of a religion poisoning everything [it is applied to] but not the religion in general. For instance the tenet of killing apostates poisons everything it touches.
Micha I think you are being motivated by what you think is right but you are making errors here somewhere. You are either communicating something you don't wish to the error lies in your moral calculus.
It's possible to have a philosophy that is not based on faith
"Micha's assertion that rule consequentialism doesn't require such a leap of faith is false."
It's possible to have a philosophical system that isn't faith based. Same goes for a moral system.
I'm sure if I had a conversation with you I could convince you that my beliefs are not faith based. I've done that before and anyone who is not completely blinkered can get it. I'm not sure if Micha's "rule consequentialism" meets is but it's certainly possible.
One need only accept beliefs tentatively then just follow the general principles of science to switch to better beliefs. Rule Consequentialism would then just be a theory that Micha holds tentatively until he comes up with a more accurate one.
Loosely, I define faith as believing in something lacking credible evidence, holding on to the belief despite credible evidence to the contrary, or holding a belief that is immune to the criticism of any kind in the first place.
The initial acceptance of a belief is not faith based if its constructed with the possibility of being falsified and you understand that it may be wrong and are willing to change beliefs the minute you find contrary evidence.
I don't know enough about "Rule Consequentialism" to tell if it meets these criteria.
Axioms vs Faith
Under rule consequentialism the rules are created and modified as necessary to generate the best consequences; they are not adhered to as a matter of faith. But like any form of consequentialism, there seems to be an underlying reliance on the idea that we should care about pursuing the best consequences. This seems self-evident to most, but it might not be objectively provable to an extreme misanthrope, for example. Quite likely every moral theory has similar axioms.
I agree with your comments on faith, and I think believing, for example, that rules that lead to more freedom and prosperity are better is a far cry from believing in an undetectable, supernatural intelligence who wants us to live a certain way.
Incredible!
"Loosely, I define faith as believing in something lacking credible evidence..."
How do you know what evidence is "credible"? Did you even stop to think that the word you used means "believable," i.e., evidence that you have faith in?
Yes, and no - credible evidence
Yes, I stopped to think. You are equivocating. I meant the second definion from American Heritage Dictionary: 2)Worthy of confidence; reliable. The word credible is meant to exclude blind acceptance of just any only evidence like, "My baby brother. He saw a real live dinosaur drinking from our swimming pool this morning".
Yes
No equivocation at all. All you are doing is re-asserting that you, indeed, do have faith in the evidence you find credible, and don't have faith in the evidence you dismiss. In your chain of justifications for any belief, at some point you either have to stop at something that is simply "self-evident" to you (e.g., you have faith in it), or you have an infinite regress. Logically speaking, there is no tertium quid.
Clarification?
Since you say "have to", I am taking you, not as pointing out a weakness that Brian Macker's argument does not share with other arguments, but as pointing out an inescapable problem with any argument attempting to come to his conclusion. Is that correct?
However, it is not entirely clear what you are saying because you write,
at some point you either have to stop at something that is simply "self-evident" to you (e.g., you have faith in it)
Since you use "e.g." instead of "i.e.", you are not denying that there are other kinds of self-evidence than faith. And yet in your previous statement you assert:
All you are doing is re-asserting that you, indeed, do have faith in the evidence you find credible
But Brian Macker did not specifically say he had faith - you concluded it. But I see no way for you to conclude such a thing unless you believe that the only possibility is that he has faith. This appears to conflict with your choice of "e.g." over "i.e." in your other statement.
So, what is it exactly that you believe must be, or might be, faith?
Might be they think I'm claiming infallibility
Constant,
Seems that all they are trying to say is "You might be mistaken in any of my beliefs" which I do not deny. I might even be mistaken in my direct observations.
Just yesterday after I wrote this it was nighttime and I was walking my dog with my son when we had an experience with observational error.
We had gotten back to my yard where I had a tree cut down. My dog put something in her mouth and my son said "She just ate a mushrom". She was chewing on something but I put my hand in and could not feel anything. If it was the size of the mushroom she had swallowed it. My son insisted it looked like a mushroom and that the area we were in grew mushrooms because of the rotting tree roots.
The kind of mushroom that grows around here on rotting wood is highly toxic so I was motivated to find out the truth, lest my dog die in a horrible manner. I had seen mushrooms there last year also and they were the poisonous kind. So I started searching that spot on the ground for a mushroom stump. But I found nothing
We went into the house and got some flashlights to start searching the spot which I marked with a maple seed. I also searched the entire area for any mushrooms and found none. I did find a dogwood flower petal with bite marks in it at that same spot. It was bruised in a way that looked like teeth marks wet with saliva. I bit it myself to see if the indentation and staining was the same and it was. I was quite releaved.
Later my dog didn't die. So I think it's reasonable to conclude that she had put the petal in her mouth but that my son having been primed by the seeing mushrooms at the location in the past had really "seen" a mushroom.
I've had similar experiences myself in the past. Once a paper bag being blown across the road initially registered as a fox in my mind. I literally saw a fox. Same with a flock of birds that looked exactly like an airplane up and until it changed shape.
So it's not just our intellectual beliefs that are influenced by past theory but also our perceptions.
So what do we do about it? Well I think it impossible to follow any chain of authority to arrive at definative validation of any belief or perception, so our only option is to check against our other beliefs and perceptions. Even this process is prone to error. I don't however need to eliminate all error, just some error. I certainly would not have bothered to check so diligently had my son claimed to have seen her eat a stick, which she likes to do.
I don't stop my inquiry about the possibility of an alligator being under my bed because of a kind of self delusion or arbitrary stopping and saying it's "self evident". No, I continue my inquiry to the level of effort that is proportional with the situation knowing full well that I could potentially continue the process to further levels. Also knowing full well that despite it all I could be making a mistake, and that I have not "proven" my belief in the sense of having arrived at a foundation and correctly deduced the truth from it. No I've only proven in the sense of the word "to prove" which means "to test". I've tested my belief to the extent that seems neccesary.
In this process I am not searching for the source of my belief but only attempting to test it's validity. No one realm is considered the final authority either. It's possible that my preexisting beliefs are wrong, my observations are wrong, that reports from others are wrong. No single counterexample is considered a final authority.
Religious faith follows exactly the opposite procedure. With religious faith you are discouraged from questioning. In fact it's considered a sin in many cases to do so. Not only that but the belief that they arrive at is claimed to come from a source which is a final authority, God.
You're equivocating on two words now "credible" and "faith"
Of course you are equivocating. You are equivocateing on the word credible and also on the word faith. Faith: 1. Confident belief in the truth, value, or trustworthiness of a person, idea, or thing. 2. Belief that does not rest on logical proof or material evidence.
I am claiming that I do not hold my beliefs on 2.
If I look under my bed and there is no alligator it does not require the kind of faith that religious people have number 2). Believing there is an invisible alligator despite not having seen, smelled, touched, talked to, or felt the imaginary alligator requires the faith of type 2.
The word faith has what are essentially two diameterically opposite meanings. I don't have the second one. The one that is defined by my original statement, "Loosely, I define faith as believing in something lacking credible
evidence, holding on to the belief despite credible evidence to the
contrary, or holding a belief that is immune to the criticism of any
kind in the first place."
I can tell you right now that there is no alligator under my bed without even looking. You want to bet me some money on that? It doesn't require any faith(2). I have faith(1) in that.
I mean really. You want me to start claiming you are homosexual? "Then when you say you are not I will say of course you're gay sometimes. So you can't claim you are never gay." Then when you say I'm equivocating between the two meanings of gay I'll just respond, "No equivocation at all. All you are doing is re-asserting that you, indeed, gay sometimes, and don't aren't at other times. But everybody knows that if you even sometimes sleep with men you are homosexual".
Do you know what equivocate means?
Drivel is drivel
"At any rate, if the brightest Jews on Earth believe in something, as Clara admits, then we should at the very least be hesitant to ridicule that belief as drivel."
If the belief is drivel then why should the fact they are bright make us hesitant to label it as such.
It's already quite clear that the religious, no matter how bright, are not using principles that tend to challenge their beliefs, nor do the various brilliant religionists agree on much of the drivel. The more it's drivel the more varied the beliefs. Sure all religions agree to some extent that murder is wrong (although some religions allow some kinds of murder) they don't all agree on the kind of drivel Micha is talking about. There's how many angels can dance on the head of a pin at one end of the spectrum and whether it's ethical to steal on the other end.
Some of the brightest people in the world believe in communism, post modernism, and socialism. Doesn't mean much of it isn't drivel.
Stanford University has some
Stanford University has some very nice pages discussing consequentialism and rule consequentialism in more detail. If you are in the mood for philosophy they are worth checking out.
Again, if morality is
Again, if morality is objective, it does take a leap of faith that seems "on par with believing in God" to believe that it exists.
I think this is importantly wrong. It ignores the entire school of constructivism, which ranges accross several types of ethical theory. Basically, something doesn't have to have simple physical existence to "exist", it can be a complex pattern of interpretation like morality that is clearly constructed by humans. It can still be studied and followed in a perfectly objective manner, as a social phenomenon. It requires no faith to study and follow a social pattern.
Check an article called "moral faith" for a serious argument in favour of the position you're taking... but while I understand that consequentialism is Dawkins' preferred theory, he is by no means committed to the view that moral properties are bare physical facts about the universe.
My position is that morality
My position is that morality is the natural right.
- Why is there a morality?
- Well because I just defined a certain set of rule and called it morality.
- Ok but why should I abide to morality? What's wrong with being immoral?
- By asking those questions (should, wrong) one already is in the realm of morality, it admits that you ought to do some things and ought not to do others.
- Ok so there is such a thing as right and wrong, but why would your rule define it?
- My rules are rationnaly discovered from a small set of normative axioms.
- What if I disagree with these axioms?
- You can, but then you don't even have to disagree, you can just kill me.
I think these periodic
I think these periodic discussions of morality are futile because you think it is all about finding the logical solution to each question.
The best answer is that morality just is. Certainly people would seek to be moral even if God were entirely refuted. Suppose entirely convincing evidence or the futility of morality and God were revealed. Then you were asked to betray your best friend with a guarantee that you would never suffer negative consequences. Say the power that convinced you said. “I want to pull your friends limbs off like an insect. Since morality is bunk and you are a rational Web Logger you can’t possibly mind telling me where he is.” Your vaunted rationally would be moot.
There are other drives that simply are, but are unexamined. The drive to eat, hunger, is never questioned. You just go and get a Big Mack. I never see any discussions about why we have sex. Only that everybody does and it needn’t be with a person of the opposite different gender. Of course, anyone can see why these drives are present.
Others are not so obvious. Once I saw a discussion by a panel of famous comedians on why jokes were funny.
It was neither funny nor explanatory of the phenomenon of humor. These same guys were capable of making you fall out of your chair laughing.
I have wondered if there is a universal moral sense that our souls respond to, like eyes respond to light and colors. Are there similar universal forces we perceive in the case of hornyness and laughter?
Of course it is a mystery but there are people in psychoanalysis and neurosciences that have interesting theories linking this stuff to what they call intersubjectivity. Even though you feel like an autonomous being there are large areas of the brain that influence social behavior. People think metaphorically, not logically. You feel moral compulsion when you put yourself in the other persons place. You are not free to ignore these parts of your brain unless you are autistic or a psychopath. This apparently has as much survival value to humans as having sex and eating. I still don’t know why we laugh. Look up Arnold H Modal. I don’t entirely understand psychoanalysis but it is a different perspective.
Arnold H Modell not Modal
Arnold H Modell not Modal
My delayed response
First of all, I didn't intend that as an ethnic reference to crafty Jews. I simply used the Jewish tradition as an example because it's familiar to me. You write what you know. The brightest men among Jews were generally pushed into the rabbinate, and that's still the case in some communities. A boys' yeshiva near my neighborhood has been cutting back lately on athletics and secular courses (science, math, literature, the history of Western civilization) to focus more on holy books.
Of course, religion has some good points. I know plenty of very sweet religious people. Should religion take credit for these folks' gentle natures and their predilection for sending all visitors home with fresh-baked cookies? (Yes, I have a saintly old neighbor in mind here.) If they lost their faith tomorrow -- or never had it in the first place -- I don't think they'd be any less kind to others. They would be better educated in secular subjects, though, and vastly more pro-active in making things happen instead of waiting for divine assistance.
Speaking of smarties -- I know a genius (not using the word lightly) who is also by far the most altruistic and honest person I know, and he's an atheist. (I love you, Dad.) That's a pathetic sample size, but for me it's a constant reminder that morality sans faith is no big deal.
And what's so great about faith-based morality, anyway? It's just fear of getting caught.
Clara
*who still fears getting caught, irrationally*
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